Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0870-2zbMath1319.91043OpenAlexW2021853915MaRDI QIDQ2351708
Gordon C. Rausser, Leo K. Simon, Jin-Hua Zhao
Publication date: 26 June 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1dv9r9t4
majority ruleinformation aggregationstrategic information transmissionstrategic communicationLIBORonline reviewsincomplete-information gamescounter-exaggerationexaggerationmean versus median mechanism
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
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