Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality

DOI10.1007/S10058-015-0169-6zbMath1315.91030OpenAlexW2124632064MaRDI QIDQ2351843

Takeshi Nishimura

Publication date: 26 June 2015

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0169-6

zbMATH Keywords

procurementoptimal auction designscoring auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Efficient Multi-Attribute Auctions Considering Supply Disruption

Cites Work

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• Equilibrium bids in practical multi-attribute auctions
• An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multiattribute RFQ Process
• Better, Faster, Cheaper: An Experimental Analysis of a Multiattribute Reverse Auction Mechanism with Restricted Information Feedback
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

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