On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations
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Publication:2357809
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.004zbMath1393.91016arXiv1412.6565OpenAlexW2962887517WikidataQ60142055 ScholiaQ60142055MaRDI QIDQ2357809
Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Mario Bravo
Publication date: 20 June 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6565
robustnessregularizationlearningNash equilibriumstochastic stabilitydominated strategiesregret minimizationstochastic game dynamics
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