Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.02.006zbMath1393.91086OpenAlexW3123221851MaRDI QIDQ2357820

Arnd Heinrich Klein, Armin Schmutzler

Publication date: 20 June 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/147520/2/Optimal_effort_akz.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

feedbackeffort incentivesdynamic tournamentsrepeated contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Competition and equilibrium effort choice ⋮ The optimal role model ⋮ Gaining advantage by winning contests ⋮ Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
• Tournaments with midterm reviews
• Incentives versus competitive balance
• Contest architecture
• Dynamic Multi‐Activity Contests*

This page was built for publication: Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments