Electric power network oligopoly as a dynamic Stackelberg game

DOI10.1007/s11067-016-9337-7zbMath1364.91107OpenAlexW2566178410MaRDI QIDQ2358058

Terry L. Friesz, Pedro A. Neto, Ke Han

Publication date: 21 June 2017

Published in: Networks and Spatial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/42967

zbMATH Keywords

electricity marketsStackelberg gameenergy economicsgame theoretic models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (4)

Efficiency and stability in electrical power transmission networks: a partition function form approach ⋮ Computation of multi-facility location Nash equilibria on a network under quantity competition ⋮ A bicriteria perspective on \(L\)-penalty approaches -- a corrigendum to Siddiqui and Gabriel's \(L\)-penalty approach for solving MPECs ⋮ Retail equilibrium with switching consumers in electricity markets

Cites Work

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• Modeling and Computing Two-Settlement Oligopolistic Equilibrium in a Congested Electricity Network
• Spatial Oligopolistic Electricity Models with Cournot Generators and Regulated Transmission Prices
• Generation Capacity Expansion in Imperfectly Competitive Restructured Electricity Markets

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