Mechanism design with information acquisition

DOI10.1007/s00199-016-0964-5zbMath1404.91038OpenAlexW2295251285MaRDI QIDQ2358793

Ichiro Obara, Sushil Bikhchandani

Publication date: 16 June 2017

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0964-5

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionmechanism designefficient implementationfull surplus extractionBayesian implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian inference (62F15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

Delegated expertise: implementability with peer-monitoring

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