Mechanism design with information acquisition
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Publication:2358793
DOI10.1007/s00199-016-0964-5zbMath1404.91038OpenAlexW2295251285MaRDI QIDQ2358793
Ichiro Obara, Sushil Bikhchandani
Publication date: 16 June 2017
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0964-5
information acquisitionmechanism designefficient implementationfull surplus extractionBayesian implementation
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Cites Work
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