Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
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Publication:2359384
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.004zbMath1400.91261OpenAlexW2615827977MaRDI QIDQ2359384
Publication date: 28 June 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.004
strategy-proofnessprobabilistic assignmentrandom serial dictatorshipex-post efficiencyequal division lower boundweak envy-freeness
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (21)
Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms ⋮ Fair solutions to the random assignment problem ⋮ On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation with outside option ⋮ Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result ⋮ On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment ⋮ A new impossibility result for random assignments ⋮ Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable ⋮ Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem ⋮ Minimal envy and popular matchings ⋮ Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem ⋮ Incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in the random assignment setting with indifferences ⋮ The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching ⋮ When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? ⋮ Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem ⋮ Shortest paths with ordinal weights ⋮ A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
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