Foundation of competitive equilibrium with non-transferable utility
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2359388
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.008zbMath1400.91297OpenAlexW2619211736MaRDI QIDQ2359388
Publication date: 28 June 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.008
matchingcompetitive equilibriumsearchnon-transferable utilityundominated equilibriumrandom proposal model
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty
- Real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria in matching models with divisible money
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- A model of random matching
- Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
- A rudimentary random-matching model with divisible money and prices
- Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
- Search theory, competitive equilibrium, and the Nash bargaining solution
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence
- Optimal Auction Design
