The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.009zbMath1400.91218OpenAlexW2592033102MaRDI QIDQ2359394

Alia Gizatulina, Martin F. Hellwig

Publication date: 28 June 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2017_02online.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designgenericityuniversal type spacesurplus extractioncorrelated informationstrategic continuity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The genericity of beliefs-determine-preferences models revisited
• On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design
• Pollution claim settlements under private information
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• Lower hemicontinuity of the Nash equilibrium correspondence
• Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
• Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction
• Uniform topologies on types
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs
• Real Analysis and Probability
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Graph Topology for Function Spaces