No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
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Publication:2362196
DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0963-2zbMath1392.91114OpenAlexW2242148343MaRDI QIDQ2362196
Publication date: 6 July 2017
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0963-2
Related Items (7)
No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects ⋮ No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion ⋮ Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
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