Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions

DOI10.1134/S0005117917010155zbMath1367.91083OpenAlexW2587738068MaRDI QIDQ2362351

V. A. Topinskiy

Publication date: 7 July 2017

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117917010155

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Endogenous firm efficiency in a Cournot principal-agent model
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
• Incentives in Teams
• Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement

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