Theoretical game analysis of position auctions according to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with two-stage ranking

DOI10.3103/S0278641916040026zbMath1367.91073OpenAlexW2555933101MaRDI QIDQ2364209

Nikita G. Blinov

Publication date: 18 July 2017

Published in: Moscow University Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3103/s0278641916040026

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumVCGposition auctionsGSPCTRclick valuecontextual advertising

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Evaluating entity linking with Wikipedia
• Non-cooperative games
• The Bargaining Problem
• Incentives in Teams
• Bidding to the Top: VCG and Equilibria of Position-Based Auctions
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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