Information structures and decentralizability of equilibria

DOI10.1007/BF01213444zbMath0866.90140OpenAlexW2025486390MaRDI QIDQ2365069

Jeffrey Jude Kline

Publication date: 4 February 1997

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213444

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumsubgame perfect equilibriumextensive gamedecentralizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Sequential Equilibria
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