Remarks on Nash equilibria for games with additively coupled payoffs

DOI10.1007/BF01213450zbMath0876.90093MaRDI QIDQ2365075

Erik J. Balder

Publication date: 4 February 1997

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaadditively coupled payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (8)

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Cites Work

• Convex analysis and measurable multifunctions
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• Remarks on Weak Compactness in L₁(μ,X)
• Existence of Saddle Points and Nash Equilibrium Points for Differential Games
• Characterizations of the Existence of Equilibria in Games with Discontinuous and Non-quasiconcave Payoffs
• New Existence Results for Optimal Controls in the Absence of Convexity: The Importance of Extremality
• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
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