Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies

DOI10.1007/BF01803951zbMath0871.90119MaRDI QIDQ2365094

Tatsuro Ichiishi, Adam Idzik

Publication date: 9 March 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationrevelation principleBayesian incentive compatible strong equilibriumBayesian societyBayesian strong equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (13)

Cooperative processing of information via choice at an information set ⋮ \(Interim\) core concepts for a Bayesian pure exchange economy ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games ⋮ Agency equilibrium ⋮ Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores ⋮ Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans ⋮ Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete ⋮ A note on the incentive compatible core ⋮ Market games with asymmetric information: the core ⋮ Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core ⋮ Incomplete information, credibility and the core ⋮ Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information ⋮ Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.

Cites Work

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• Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• Equilibrium Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information

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