A value for partially defined cooperative games

DOI10.1007/BF01240152zbMath0793.90104MaRDI QIDQ2366101

Stephen J. Willson

Publication date: 29 June 1993

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueaxiomatization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

1-convex extensions of incomplete cooperative games and the average value ⋮ Incomplete cooperative games with player-centered information ⋮ A fundamental study for partially defined cooperative games ⋮ Characterization of a value for games under restricted cooperation ⋮ Extension of Owen value for the game with a coalition structure under the limited feasible coalition

Cites Work

• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Game theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority
• A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• Convex Analysis

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