Abelian symmetry groups in social choice

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(92)90022-WzbMath0779.90005OpenAlexW2084768662MaRDI QIDQ2366119

Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date: 29 June 1993

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(92)90022-w

zbMATH Keywords

symmetryfinite abelian groupgroup of permutationssocial choice rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Finite abelian groups (20K01) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Dictionaries
• Symmetry, voting, and social choice
• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Algebraic results on collective choice rules
• The ultimate of chaos resulting from weighted voting systems
• Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings
• Symmetry groups
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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