Existence and local stability of Pareto superior reaction function equilibria in discounted supergames
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Publication:2366713
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90008-9zbMath0793.90107OpenAlexW1992660853MaRDI QIDQ2366713
Jean-Pierre P. Langlois, Jonathan A. Sachs
Publication date: 16 August 1994
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90008-9
\(n\)-player discounted supergameslocally asymptotically stable subgame perfect reaction function equilibria
Cites Work
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