Entry deterrence and overexploitation of the fishery

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(93)90052-TzbMath0772.90024OpenAlexW2001719309MaRDI QIDQ2366880

Philippe Crabbé, Ngo Van Long

Publication date: 30 August 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(93)90052-t

zbMATH Keywords

entry deterrenceoverexploitationfishery exploitationStackelberg game models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economic growth models (91B62) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items

Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey ⋮ EFFORT SUBSIDIES AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERIES ⋮ When additional resource stocks reduce welfare

Cites Work

• Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices
• Noncooperative solutions for a differential game model of fishery
• Expectations and stability in oligopoly models
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
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