Incentive compatibility and competitive allocations

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90008-MzbMath0772.90028OpenAlexW2033762531MaRDI QIDQ2366945

Matthew O. Jackson

Publication date: 23 August 1993

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90008-m

zbMATH Keywords

competitive allocationsincensitive compatibilitynumber of individuals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (12)

Informational robustness of competitive equilibria. ⋮ Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing ⋮ Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies ⋮ Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments ⋮ Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing ⋮ Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets ⋮ Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies ⋮ Monotone strategyproofness ⋮ Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints ⋮ Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms

Cites Work

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• Topological methods in Walrasian economics
• The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies

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