Divide and conquer. On the profitability of forming independent rival divisions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90019-UzbMath0772.90035OpenAlexW2013934541MaRDI QIDQ2366948

Stephen Polasky

Publication date: 23 August 1993

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90019-u

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumStackelberg gameCournot gamecyclical fluctuations in market concentration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Divisionalization and franchising incentives with integral competing units ⋮ Divisionalization with asymmetric production costs ⋮ Divisionalization and product differentiation ⋮ The strategic decentralization of recruiting ⋮ On the competitive effects of divisionalization ⋮ Unionized labor market and licensing by a monopolist ⋮ On the social (sub)optimality of divisionalization under product differentiation ⋮ Delegation in multiproduct downstream firms with heterogeneous channels

Cites Work

• Contributions to Cournot oligopoly theory
• The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles

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