On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set

DOI10.1007/BF01240251zbMath0773.90098MaRDI QIDQ2367179

Joseph Greenberg

Publication date: 20 July 1993

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coresocial situationsabstract stable settransferable utilitiesindividual stable bargaining sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

Social norms and core outcomes in a sharecropping economy ⋮ Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games ⋮ A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura) ⋮ The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games ⋮ Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets ⋮ Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games ⋮ On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games

Cites Work

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• A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann- Morgenstern solution
• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• A consistent bargaining set
• Stability when mobility is restricted by the existing coalition structure
• Constrained egalitarian allocations
• A cardinal bargaining set for games without side payments
• The kernel of the composition of characteristic function games
• Cores of Convex Games Without Side Payments
• An Ordinal Bargaining Set for Games Without Side Payments
• Viable Proposals
• Existence of general bargaining sets for cooperative games without side payments

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