Exploitable actions of believers in the ``law of small numbers in repeated constant-sum games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.11.001zbMath1280.91029OpenAlexW2092517301MaRDI QIDQ2370500

Steven Scroggin

Publication date: 26 June 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral economicsbounded rationalityexperimental economicslocal representativeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Beyond fictitious play beliefs: incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching

Cites Work

• The gambler's fallacy and the hot hand: empirical data from casinos
• Learning behavior in an experimental matching pennies game
• Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium
• Conditional universal consistency.
• Professionals Play Minimax
• An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning
• Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.
• Inference by Believers in the Law of Small Numbers
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• On the irrelevance of risk attitudes in repeated two-outcome games

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