On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.008zbMath1280.91022OpenAlexW2073705515WikidataQ57937015 ScholiaQ57937015MaRDI QIDQ2370503

Karl H. Schlag, Dieter Balkenborg

Publication date: 26 June 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10036/4276

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsreplicator dynamicNash equilibrium componentregular selection dynamicsstrict equilibrium set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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