A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.003zbMath1271.91084OpenAlexW3121541235MaRDI QIDQ2371150

M. Bumin Yenmez, Federico Echenique

Publication date: 29 June 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-153108432

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycorecoalition formationtwo-sided matchingcollege admission problemsimple matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (29)

Matching with aggregate externalities ⋮ Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment ⋮ Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities ⋮ Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market ⋮ Many-to-one matchings without substitutability ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Stable matching: An integer programming approach ⋮ Constitutions and groups ⋮ School choice with neighbors ⋮ Stability in matching markets with peer effects ⋮ Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015) ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods ⋮ Finding all stable matchings with couples ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions ⋮ Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching ⋮ Two-sided coalitional matchings ⋮ Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching ⋮ Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching ⋮ Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games ⋮ Stable Matching in Large Economies ⋮ Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities ⋮ Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

Cites Work

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• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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