The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.008zbMath1271.91018OpenAlexW2169706192MaRDI QIDQ2371152

Gerard van der Laan, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Adolphus J. J. Talman

Publication date: 29 June 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/04043.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchysocial structuretransferable utility gamesocially stable core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations ⋮ Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems ⋮ A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES

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