Deliberative voting

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.002zbMath1156.91340OpenAlexW4249235348MaRDI QIDQ2373777

Dino Gerardi, Leeat Yariv

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1723683

zbMATH Keywords

communicationstrategic votingcollective choicejuries

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites Work

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• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
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• Perfect correlated equilibria
• Information acquisition in committees
• An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation
• Universal Mechanisms
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

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