Deliberative voting
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Publication:2373777
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.002zbMath1156.91340OpenAlexW4249235348MaRDI QIDQ2373777
Publication date: 16 July 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1723683
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- Information acquisition in committees
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- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
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