Limited observability as a constraint in contract design

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.008zbMath1158.91413OpenAlexW2130473146MaRDI QIDQ2373781

Steven R. Williams, Stefan Krasa

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.008

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitycontractual incompletenesslimited observability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Limited observability as a constraint in contract design

Cites Work

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• Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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