Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.006zbMath1156.91441OpenAlexW1964891449MaRDI QIDQ2373788

Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.006

zbMATH Keywords

matching problemvon Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites Work

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• Cores of convex games
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• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings

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