Maximally representative allocations for guaranteed delivery advertising campaigns

DOI10.1007/s10058-013-0141-2zbMath1277.90057OpenAlexW2141022910MaRDI QIDQ2375891

R. Preston McAfee, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Kishore Papineni

Publication date: 25 June 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0141-2

zbMATH Keywords

market designmechanism designadvertisingbiddingexchangerepresentativeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (6)

Integrated Ad Delivery Planning for Targeted Display Advertising ⋮ A Low Complexity Algorithm with $O(\sqrt{T})$ Regret and $O(1)$ Constraint Violations for Online Convex Optimization with Long Term Constraints ⋮ Maximally representative allocations for guaranteed delivery advertising campaigns ⋮ Robust optimization for spread quality and shortfall in guaranteed targeted display advertising planning ⋮ Planning Online Advertising Using Gini Indices ⋮ Cost-per-Impression Pricing for Display Advertising

Cites Work

• Why least squares and maximum entropy? An axiomatic approach to inference for linear inverse problems
• Maximally representative allocations for guaranteed delivery advertising campaigns
• On the Stability of the Competitive Equilibrium, II

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