The arbitrage pricing theorem with incomplete preferences
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Publication:2381462
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.04.001zbMath1186.91102OpenAlexW2035668565WikidataQ57938760 ScholiaQ57938760MaRDI QIDQ2381462
Publication date: 18 September 2007
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.04.001
Related Items
Incomplete preferences on conditional random quantities: representability by conditional previsions ⋮ Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Markets with Non-Ordered Preferences ⋮ Continuous multi-utility representations of preorders ⋮ Optimal risk-sharing under mutually singular beliefs
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