The stable fixtures problem -- a many-to-many extension of stable roommates

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2007.05.015zbMath1155.91437OpenAlexW2072912047MaRDI QIDQ2384396

Sandy Scott, Robert W. Irving

Publication date: 21 September 2007

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2007.05.015

zbMATH Keywords

linear-time algorithmmany-to-many non-bipartite matchingStable matching problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (10)

The stable fixtures problem with payments ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Stable and meta-stable contract networks ⋮ The integral stable allocation problem on graphs ⋮ Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem ⋮ The stable tournament problem: matching sports schedules with preferences ⋮ Overlays with preferences: distributed, adaptive approximation algorithms for matching with preference lists ⋮ On the stable \(b\)-matching problem in multigraphs ⋮ Rotations in the stable \(b\)-matching problem ⋮ The Stable Fixtures Problem with Payments

Cites Work

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• Stable marriage and indifference
• Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
• The Stable Roommates Problem with Ties
• Lower Bounds for the Stable Marriage Problem and Its Variants
• NP-complete stable matching problems
• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• The Structure of the Stable Roommate Problem: Efficient Representation and Enumeration of All Stable Assignments
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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