Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
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Publication:2384430
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.011zbMath1155.91351OpenAlexW3121344639MaRDI QIDQ2384430
Publication date: 21 September 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.middlebury.edu/services/econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/0206.pdf
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