Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
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Publication:2384433
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.006zbMath1155.91324OpenAlexW2154498015MaRDI QIDQ2384433
Roger B. Myerson, Dino Gerardi
Publication date: 21 September 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1723686
Related Items (5)
Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Mechanism design with informational punishment ⋮ Perfect implementation ⋮ An integrative approach with sequential game to real-time gate assignment under CDM mechanism ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games
Cites Work
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- Universal Mechanisms
- Multistage Games with Communication
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Sequential Equilibria
- Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
- Long Cheap Talk
- Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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