A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes

DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0073-6zbMath1210.91010OpenAlexW2103138954MaRDI QIDQ2384717

Alexander Zimper

Publication date: 10 October 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0073-6

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot competitionunique Nash equilibriumsupermodular gamesstrategic substitutesiterative solution concepts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (5)

Games with strategic complements and substitutes ⋮ Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes ⋮ Directional monotone comparative statics ⋮ Uniqueness, stability and comparative statics for two-person Bayesian games with strategic substitutes ⋮ A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Pure Strategy Dominance
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

This page was built for publication: A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes