A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center

DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0074-5zbMath1138.91009OpenAlexW2001071031MaRDI QIDQ2384718

Julio González-Díaz, Estela Sánchez Rodríguez

Publication date: 10 October 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0074-5

zbMATH Keywords

corecenter of gravitycooperative TU games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (21)

Airport games: the core and its center ⋮ Towards an axiomatization of the core-center ⋮ On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values ⋮ Stable solutions for multiple scenario cost allocation games with partial information ⋮ Monotonicity of the core-center of the airport game ⋮ Refining the Lorenz‐ranking of rules for claims problems on restricted domains ⋮ The nucleolus and the core-center of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets ⋮ Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods ⋮ Deviation from proportionality and Lorenz-domination for claims problems ⋮ An average lexicographic value for cooperative games ⋮ The general compromise value for cooperative games with transferable utility ⋮ Understanding the coincidence of allocation rules: symmetry and orthogonality in TU-games ⋮ NON-COOPERATIVE AND AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE AVERAGE LEXICOGRAPHIC VALUE ⋮ Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets ⋮ Undominated nonnegative excesses and core extensions of transferable utility games ⋮ The average-of-awards rule for claims problems ⋮ The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games ⋮ Considerations on the aggregate monotonicity of the nucleolus and the core-center ⋮ Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games ⋮ Associated games to optimize the core of a transferable utility game ⋮ Cooperative game theory approach to allocating benefits of horizontal cooperation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Continuous selections. I
• A weak monotonicity property of the nucleolus
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Core and monotonic allocation methods.
• A geometric characterisation of the compromise value
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• A selection of convex-compact-valued multi-functions with remarkable properties: the steiner selection
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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