A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market

DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0091-4zbMath1126.91006OpenAlexW2066875349MaRDI QIDQ2384724

Carles Rafels, Marina Núñez, Josep Maria Izquierdo

Publication date: 10 October 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/275.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coreassignment gameextreme core pointsmax-payoff vectors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Comments on: ``Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities ⋮ Rejoinder on: ``Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities ⋮ On a class of vertices of the core ⋮ Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games ⋮ A survey on assignment markets ⋮ Assignment markets with the same core ⋮ Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game? ⋮ Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games ⋮ A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game

Cites Work

• Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property
• Cooperative games with large cores
• Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game.
• Assignment games with stable core
• Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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