The core-partition of a hedonic game
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Publication:2384878
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.05.007zbMath1283.91014OpenAlexW2149883518MaRDI QIDQ2384878
Publication date: 10 October 2007
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/87
Related Items (17)
Generating Empirical Core Size Distributions of Hedonic Games Using a Monte Carlo Method ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ Bargaining cum voice ⋮ Set-valued solution concepts using interval-type payoffs for interval games ⋮ On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015) ⋮ Farsighted rationality in hedonic games ⋮ Rationing rules and stable coalition structures ⋮ Subordinated hedonic games ⋮ Hedonic games related to many-to-one matching problems ⋮ Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players ⋮ Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices ⋮ Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities ⋮ Coalition formation with local public goods and group-size effect ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion ⋮ An empirical distribution of the number of subsets in the core partitions of hedonic games ⋮ A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES ⋮ Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations
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