Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
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Publication:2385061
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0202-3zbMath1280.91058OpenAlexW2105480970MaRDI QIDQ2385061
Stefan Maus, Ton Storcken, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 11 October 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/857952/guid-4790b705-feee-4324-a09e-7c5507702456-ASSET1.0.pdf
Related Items (10)
Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity ⋮ Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship ⋮ Gains from manipulating social choice rules ⋮ An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules ⋮ Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability ⋮ Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions ⋮ Dictatorship versus manipulability
Cites Work
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- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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