Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
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Publication:2385108
DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0130-6zbMath1135.91016OpenAlexW3124125994MaRDI QIDQ2385108
Shigehiro Serizawa, Soo Hong Chew
Publication date: 11 October 2007
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13554
inductionstrategy-proofnesssimultaneous ascending auctionsheterogeneous commoditiessmoothly connected domainsVickrey combinatorial auction
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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