Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction

DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0130-6zbMath1135.91016OpenAlexW3124125994MaRDI QIDQ2385108

Shigehiro Serizawa, Soo Hong Chew

Publication date: 11 October 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13554

zbMATH Keywords

inductionstrategy-proofnesssimultaneous ascending auctionsheterogeneous commoditiessmoothly connected domainsVickrey combinatorial auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (15)

Joint misrepresentation with bribes ⋮ Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction ⋮ Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement ⋮ Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains ⋮ A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems ⋮ Ordinal allocation ⋮ Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity ⋮ Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism ⋮ Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions ⋮ Vickrey allocation rule with income effect ⋮ An introduction to mechanized reasoning ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money ⋮ Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains

Cites Work

• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
• Incentives in Teams
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• A Note on the Characterization of Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains

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