Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0211-2zbMath1180.91098OpenAlexW2012988652MaRDI QIDQ2385123

Kevin W. S. Roberts

Publication date: 11 October 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0211-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Simple collective equilibria in stopping games

Cites Work

• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model
• The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule

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