Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.06.006zbMath1114.91078OpenAlexW4299958041MaRDI QIDQ2386136

Sérgio O. Parreiras

Publication date: 22 August 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.17615/nd81-sk34

zbMATH Keywords

Blackwell's theoremInformation rentsSurplus extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (5)

Mechanism design with information acquisition ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Comment on ``Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217] ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible

Cites Work

• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• A simple proof of Blackwell's Comparison of experiments theorem
• Continuity in auction design
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• Surplus Extraction and Competition
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design

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