The Borda count and agenda manipulation

DOI10.1007/s003550050105zbMath1066.91517OpenAlexW1976852824MaRDI QIDQ2386273

Michael Dummett

Publication date: 22 August 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050105

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (9)

Defining the Borda count in a linguistic decision making context ⋮ An interview with Michael Dummett: From analytical philosophy to voting analysis and beyond ⋮ Preference integration and optimization of multistage weighted voting system based on ordinal preference ⋮ Preference densities and social choices ⋮ Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences ⋮ Finding the threshold of exclusion for all single seat and multi-seat scoring rules: illustrated by results for the Borda and Dowdall rules ⋮ Why the Count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet ⋮ Voces populi and the art of listening ⋮ A New Binary Programming Formulation and Social Choice Property for Kemeny Rank Aggregation

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