An informationally parsimonious impartial observer theorem

DOI10.1007/s003550050108zbMath1066.91504OpenAlexW2070118078MaRDI QIDQ2386275

Edi Karni, John A. Weymark

Publication date: 22 August 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050108

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Taxation behind the veil of ignorance ⋮ Equally-distributed equivalent utility, ex post egalitarianism and utilitarianism ⋮ Twofold optimality of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution ⋮ The ignorant observer ⋮ An extension of a theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern with an application to social choice theory

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