Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions

DOI10.1007/s003550050117zbMath1066.91536OpenAlexW2038850267MaRDI QIDQ2386286

Peter Fristrup, Hans Keiding

Publication date: 22 August 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050117

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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