Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good

DOI10.1007/s003550050134zbMath1066.91570OpenAlexW2022880222MaRDI QIDQ2386305

Shinji Ohseto

Publication date: 22 August 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050134

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (10)

Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations ⋮ Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money ⋮ Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods ⋮ House allocation with transfers ⋮ Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains

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