Stability in dynamic matching markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.014zbMath1099.91076OpenAlexW2148740516MaRDI QIDQ2387312

Ricky Lam, Ettore Damiano

Publication date: 2 September 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.014

zbMATH Keywords

CredibilityRecursive coreRepeated matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (11)

Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers ⋮ Dynamically stable matching ⋮ Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Stability in repeated matching markets ⋮ Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets ⋮ Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching ⋮ Influencing waiting lists ⋮ Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information ⋮ Matching While Learning ⋮ Monge Properties, Optimal Greedy Policies, and Policy Improvement for the Dynamic Stochastic Transportation Problem ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Equilibrium in a discrete exchange economy with money
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
• Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint
• Credible coalitions and the core
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• The Recursive Core
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Stability in dynamic matching markets