Learning in perturbed asymmetric games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.006zbMath1099.91028OpenAlexW2117255278MaRDI QIDQ2387315

Josef Hofbauer, Ed Hopkins

Publication date: 2 September 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.006

zbMATH Keywords

Mixed strategy equilibriaBest response dynamicsPotential gamesStochastic fictitious playZero sum games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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