Divide-and-permute
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2387317
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.009zbMath1102.91008OpenAlexW2121163605WikidataQ59972789 ScholiaQ59972789MaRDI QIDQ2387317
Publication date: 2 September 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.009
Related Items (26)
Procedurally fair implementation under complete information ⋮ Divide and compromise ⋮ Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents ⋮ A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set ⋮ Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games ⋮ Strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Are incentives against economic justice? ⋮ A non-cooperative interpretation of the \(f\)-just rules of bankruptcy problems ⋮ Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations ⋮ Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem ⋮ Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ A noncooperative interpretation of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set ⋮ Strategic divide and choose ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel ⋮ Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market ⋮ A strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule through a procedurally fair multilateral bargaining game ⋮ A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds ⋮ Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies ⋮ Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good ⋮ Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors ⋮ Sir Thomas Muir, 1844--1934 ⋮ A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution ⋮ The recursive core for non-superadditive games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Fair division of a measurable space
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Strategy space reduction for feasible implementation of Walrasian performance
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Equity and the core
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies
- On the fair division of a heterogeneous commodity
- Consistent extensions
- Games of fair division
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
- Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- How to Cut a Cake Fairly
- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- A Game of Fair Division
- A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Toward Natural Implementation
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
This page was built for publication: Divide-and-permute
