Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives
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Publication:2388752
DOI10.1007/s003550050020zbMath1069.91559OpenAlexW2008748228MaRDI QIDQ2388752
Publication date: 20 September 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050020
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